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THE FEDERAL-STATE OFFSHORE OIL DISPUTE
The depth of the sea increases gradually for a distance of several miles
from the coast. Experts have estimated that this submerged land con-
tains over ten billion barrels of oil.' The discovery of this oil, and the
development of technological advances allowing its extraction, have led
to what has been aptly described as "the greatest land case in history." 2
For years the right of ownership of the seabed mineral wealth has been
vigorously contested. Claimants have included the federal government,
various state governments, American Indians,' farm co-operatives,4 and
private land speculators.5 The only serious contestants for ownership
of the seabed wealth, however, have been the federal and coastal state
governments.
HISTORY OF LITIGATION AND LEGISLATION
Ownership of the Seabed
Until 1937 the coastal states exercised control over the seabed with-
out dispute from the federal government.6 The states collected taxes
in connection with fishing rights7 and exercised general police powers
in the area." This exercise of dominion was allowed to continue by the
United States Supreme CourtY When the federal government desired
possession of submerged coastal land, it purchased such land from a
state.' 0 In 1937, the Secretary of the Interior threatened to reverse the
prior policy of his department by issuing federal leases to offshore
1. S. REP. No. 1143, 82d Cong., 2d Sess. 5 (1952).
2. Hanna, The Submerged Land Cases, 3 STAN. L. REv. 193, 218 (1951).
3. Kieck, Applicants After Tidelands as Private Wealth Source, Times-Picayune and
New Orleans States as reprinted in 97 CONG. REc. A5371, A5372 (1951).
4. Id. at A5372-A5373.
5. Kleck, Cord Serious in Scrip Grab Try for Gulf Oil Millions, Times-Picayune
& New Orleans States as reprinted in 97 CONG. REc. A5589 (1951).
6. H.R. REP. No. 1778, 80th Cong., 2d Sess. 17 (1948).
7. 99 CONG. REc. 2499 (1953) (remarks of Congressman Nicholson).
8. 99 CONG. REc. 2501 (1953) (remarks of Congressman Reed).
9. H.R. REP. No. 1778, supra note 6, at 16; Gross, The Maritime Boundaries of the
States, 64 Mic8. L. REv. 639, 640 (1966); Hardwicke, Illig, & Patterson, The Constitu-
tion and the Continental Shelf, 26 TExAs L. REv. 398, 402 (1948); Illig, Tidelands-An
Unsolved Problem, 24 Tv-L. L. REv. 51, 52 (1949).
10. H.R. REP. No. 1778, supra note 6, at 12-13.
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lands." In the same year an unsuccessful effort was made to have Con-
gress establish federal ownership of the seabed for a distance of three
miles from the coast.' 2
Serious court action was initiated in 1945 when the federal govern-
ment brought suit against the state of California in the United States
Supreme Court.'" In holding for the federal government, the Court
decided only that the state of California did not own the seabed."4 It
refused to expressly acknowledge ownership by the United States."
The rationale of the decision appears to have been that the federal gov-
ernment should prevail because of its responsibilities for national security
and international relations.' 6 The Court rejected arguments that federal
claims should be estopped because of past failure to assert authority in
the area,17 that the state had acquired ownership by prescription, that
the present federal action was barred by the principle of res judicata, and
that the state was admitted to the union while owning the seabed.'
In 1950 the Court discouraged the ambitions of Louisiana 9 and
Texas20 in much the same manner as it had those of California. Again
the decision was based upon considerations of federal responsibility for
the national interest.2 '
The rulings on the claims of these three states resulted in a cessation
of the expansion of offshore oil operations, 22 and "changed the battle-
11. Hardwicke, supra note 9, at 401.
12. Id.
13. Hardwicke, supra note 9, at 403.
14. United States v. California, 332 U.S. 804, 805 (1947) (order and decree handed
down for United States v. California, 332 U.S. 19 (1947)).
15. See United States v. Texas, 339 U.S. 707, 723-24 (1950) (Frankfurter, J, dis-
senting). The Court refused to place language in its decree expressly indicating that
ownership was in the United States Government.
16. United States v. California, 332 U.S. 19, 35-36 (1947). The Court stated that
"national interests, responsibilities, and therefore national rights are paramount in waters
lying to the seaward in the three-mile belt." Id. at 36.
17. Id. at 40: "The Government . . . is not to be deprived of . . . interests by the
ordinary court rules designed particularly for private disputes over individually owned
pieces of property ......
18. Id. at 23-24.
19. United States v. Louisiana, 339 U.S. 699 (1950).
20. United States v. Texas, 339 U.S. 707 (1950).
21. United States v. Louisiana, 339 U.S. 699, 704 (1950); United States v. Texas, 399
U.S. 707, 719 (1950).
If the property . . .lies seaward of the low-water mark, its use, disposi-
tion, management, and control involve national interests and national
responsibilities. That is the source of national rights in it.
22. H.R. RF'. No. 215, 83d Cong., 1st Sess. 2 (1953).
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ground from the ... Court to Capital Hill." 23 Three bills were passed
by Congress giving the coastal states partial ownership of the seabed.
Two of these were vetoed by President Truman24 but the third was
signed into law by President Eisenhower. -5
The successful bill, intended to reverse the court decisions, is known
as the Submerged Lands Act.20 It granted all coastal states ownership
of the seabed for a distance of at least three miles from their coast line.
Each gulf coast state was allowed to claim up to three marine leagues
if its boundary had extended to that distance when admitted as a state.28
While the Act is still law, it has been challenged in both Congress and
the Court. At least one attempt has been made to repeal parts of the
Act.20 Alabama and Rhode Island have judicially attacked it, challeng-
ing its constitutionality. The Supreme Court rejected this attack, hold-
ing that "[t] he power over the public land . .. entrusted to Congress
is without limitations." 3o
The Submerged Lands Act was intended to settle the dispute over
submerged areas between federal and state authorities. Unfortunately
it was unsuccessful in this purpose; the battle merely shifted to another
issue. The United States sued the gulf coast states of Louisiana, Texas,
Mississippi, Alabama, and Florida to limit their seabed claims, under the
Submerged Lands Act, to three miles, instead of three marine leagues.3l
23. Wright, Jurisdiction in the Tidelands, 32 TUL. L. REv. 175, 179 (1958).
24. The vetoed bills were H.RJ. Res. 225, 79th Cong., 1st Sess. (1946) (veto message
92 CONG. REc. 10660 (1946)); S.J. Res. 20, 82d Cong., 2d Sess. (1952) (veto message
98 CONG. REc. 6251 (1952)).
25. Wright, supra note 23, at 179.
26. 43 U.S.C. §§ 1301-15 (1964).
27. Id. at § 1301(b).
28. Id. at § 1301(b):
The term "boundaries" includes the seaward boundaries of a State or its
boundaries in the Gulf of Mexico . .. as they existed at the time such
State became a member of the Union ...but in no event shall the term
"boundaries" ... be interpreted as extending from the coast line more than
three geographical miles into the ... Ocean ... or more than three marine
leagues into the Gulf of Mexico ....
29. 100 CoNG. REc. 4348 (1954). Senator Douglas initiated an attempt to repeal parts
of the Act.
30. Alabama v. Texas, 347 U.S. 272, 273 (1954) (per curian). U.S. CoNsT. art. IV,
§ 3: "The Congress shall have power to dispose of and make all needful Rules and
Regulations respecting the territory or other property belonging to the United
States ... .
31. United States v. Louisiana, 363 U.S. 1 (1960) (opinion for all states except
Florida); United States v. Florida, 363 U.S. 121 (1960) (opinion on Florida's motion
for judgment on the pleadings).
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The Court considered historical documents and events and decided that
Louisiana, Alabama, and Mississippi were entitled to three miles, 32 and
Florida and Texas to three marine leagues. 3
Dividing the Seabed
Allowing the states ownership of part of the seabed made it necessary
for a line to be drawn separating state and federal property. The prop-
erty line was to be drawn, under the Submerged Lands Act, not more
than three miles or marine leagues from the coast line. 4 Coast line was
defined as "the line of ordinary low water along that portion of the
coast which is in direct contact with the open sea and the line marking
the seaward limit of inland waters .... . Several major difficulties
arise with any practical application of this definition.
The first major problem involves location of the coast line where
rivers, bays, and islands are found in the coastal area. It can only be
solved by the adoption of subjective rules. This problem was recog-
nized in the first offshore lands case3 6 and was dealt with by a court-
appointed master.3 7 He recommended use of the Boggs principles.'
His report was not completely applied, however, for almost twenty
years,3'9 and then the Supreme Court substituted the rules in the Geneva
Convention on the Territorial Sea and the Contiguous Zone40 in place
of the Boggs rules.41 By application of the revised master's report, the
Court held the waters between the mainland of California and her
offshore islands to be open sea.42
A second problem involved in applying the Act's definition of coast
line is whether or not the coast line should be drawn to include man-
made structures. In litigation with the United States, Texas claimed
that the line should be drawn to include coastal structures, a position
32. United States v. Louisiana, 363 U.S. 1, 79, 82 (1960).
33. Id. at 64; United States v. Florida, 363 U.S. 121, 129 (1960).
34. 43 U.S.C. § 1301(b) (1964).
35. Id. at § 1301(c).
36. United States v. California, 332 U.S. 19, 26 (1947).
37. United States v. California, 381 U.S. 139, 142-43 (1965).
38. Boggs, Delimitation of the Territorial Sea, 24 AM. J. INTL L. 541 (1930).
39. The master was appointed in United States v. California, 334 US. 855 (1948) and
his report approved in United States v. California, 381 U.S. 139, 177 (1965).
40. Oct. 31, 1958, [1964] 15 U.S.T. 1606, T.I.A.S. No. 5639.
41. United States v. California, 381 U.S. 139, 165, 177 (1965). The Court entered
the decree in 382 U.S. 448 (1966).
42. United States v. California, 381 U.S. 139, 167-69 (1965).
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supported by the Geneva Convention. The Supreme Court, however,
refused to adopt the present Texas coastline with man-made struc-
tures, as it had for California earlier, because Texas was claiming three
leagues under the Submerged Lands Act on the basis of its boundary
when admitted as a state.43 Texas was forced to measure its three leagues
from its coastline of 1845, the year of her admission to the Union even
though "both sides were at a loss to suggest any means by which the
1845 location of the boundary could be ascertained... ." ,44
Finally, another problem arises in drawing a coastline under the Sub-
merged Lands Act because the low-water line varies with the passage
of time in some coastal areas. 45 For example, the Louisiana "shoreline is
constantly shifting as the Mississippi River and violent gulf storms
remold the soft, silt-like delta soil." 46 This problem was a major pre-
mise in Louisiana's argument for adoption of a navigation line laid out
by the Coast Guard47 as the most practical coast line in the most recent
submerged lands decision.48 In spite of practical considerations, the
Supreme Court refused to adopt the navigation line as the coast line
because Congress never intended that it be the national boundary.49
THE, UNSETTLED DISPUTE
After twenty-two years of litigation, the basic issue of the ownership
of coastal lands is still unsettled. On April 1, 1969, the federal govern-
ment initiated suits against thirteen eastern states5" to enjoin acts of
proprietorship over the seabed further than three miles from their
coasts. 1 Nine states have filed answers with the Supreme Court, coun-
tering the federal contention. These states will divide the legal costs
on the basis of population and length of coastline. 52  Federal action
43. United States v. Louisiana, 389 U.S. 155, 157-61 (1967).
44. Id. at 177 n.34 (Harlan, J., dissenting).
45. United States v. Louisiana, 394 U.S. 11, 32-34 (1969).
46. Id. at 33.
47. Act of February 19, 1895, 28 Stat. 672, 33 U.S.C. § 151 (1964).
48. United States v. Louisiana, 394 U.S. 11 (1969).
49. Id. at 17-21.
50. "Maine, New Hampshire, Massachusetts, Rhode Island, New York, New Jersey,
Delaware, Maryland, Virginia, North and South Carolina, Georgia and Florida." The
Evening Star (Washington, D.C.), April 2, 1969, at 18, col. 7.
51. Scharfenberg, Md. Bases Case on 1632 Grant, The Washington Post, Sept. 15,
1969, § C, at 1, col. 7.
52. Id.
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against these eastern states was evidently aroused by Maine's issuing a
seabed oil lease eighty-eight miles from the coast.
53
As litigation in this area continues, so does legislative activity. It is
possible that the Submerged Lands Act may not be the finale of the
legislative portion of this dispute. Work has already commenced on
further legislation. Twenty-six states have joined to work on this proj-
ect, designed to gain state control over the seabed mineral wealth "lying
outside the three-mile limit... worth 'trillions of dollars' ...... ' The
attorneys general of the thirteen eastern states involved in the above
suit are also working on proposed legislation which they expect to
present to Congress in the near future.55
CONSIDERATIONS RELEVANT TO ANY SOLUTION
As noted above, after decades of litigation and legislation, the issue
of ownership of the seabed is still unsettled. Settlement attempts have
been made by the courts and Congress, but none has succeeded. Prior
to consideration here of possible permanent solutions to the problem,
there are four factors which should be discussed.
International Problems and Considerations
Historically the ocean and seabed have been considered as belonging
to no one.5 The United States has, in theory at least, adhered to this in-
ternational concept of "freedom of the seas." 57 Traditionally, however,
most nations, including the United States, have exercised national juris-
diction over the sea for a distance of three miles from the coast line.58 As
discussed above, a number of coastal states have asserted, and some con-
tinue to assert, territorial claims beyond three miles. These claims, if
recognized, might lead to problems in international relations.5 9 One
writer has suggested that the three leagues given to Texas may make
settlement of the offshore boundary between this country and Mexico
53. Id. § C, at 5, col. 5.
54. The Washington Post, May 19, 1969, § C, at 2, col. 5.
55. Scharfenberg, supra note 51, § C, at 5, col. 3.
56. H.R. REP. No. 695, 82d Cong., 1st Sess. 74, 76 (1951).
57. H.R. REP. No. 215, supra note 22, at 116.
58. Loret, Louisiana's Twenty-Seven Mile Maritime Belt, 13 TuL- L. R~v. 253, 255
(1939).
59. H.R. REP. No. 215, supra note 22, at 116; Letter from William Bishop, Professor
of International Law, University of Michigan, to George Meader, Member of
Congress, 99 CoNG. Rac. 2491 (1953).
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more difficult.6 The offshore oil itself may be involved in an interna-
tional controversy. 61 Federal control, therefore, seems necessary due to
these considerations of international relations.6 2 Another result of allow-
ing any state to claim more than three miles of seabed is that this might
stimulate excessive claims by other countries.63
It has been argued that it is immaterial in international affairs whether
the central or component units of government own the adjacent seabed.64
"Ownership is one thing and territorial sovereignty is another, and loss
of one does not mean loss of the other." 5 Even though three miles
was the historic claim, it is today clearly the minority view since most
nations claim considerably more.66 Traditionally and technically, the
United States has claimed three miles, but it has exercised various types
of jurisdiction over a greater area where circumstances dictated. Legis-
lative extensions of jurisdiction include: the Outer Continental Shelf
Lands Act of 1953,67 which extended to the end of the Continental
Shelf the national claim to the seabed; moreover, smugglers' vessels
may be seized outside of the three-mile limit;68 and United States citizens
have special, exclusive fishing rights in coastal areas more than three
miles from shore."
Legal Considerations
When United States v. California came before the Supreme Court,
no legislation existed to serve as a basis for settlement of the seabed dis-
pute;70 nor was there any applicable case law.71 Therefore, the Court
60. Warbrick, Off-Shore Petroleum Exploitation in Federal Systems; Canadian and
Australian Action, 17 INT'L & CoMp. L.Q. 501, 506 (1968).
61. United States v. California, 332 U.S. 19, 35 (1947).
62. Id. at 35, 36.
63. S. REP. No. 133, 83d Cong., 1st Sess., pr. 2, at 26 (1953).
64. Gross, The Maritime Boundaries of the States, 64 MiCH. L. Rv. 639, 645 (1966).
65. Letter from William Bishop, supra note 59.
66. One recent survey disclosed that thirty-six nations claimed 3 miles, four 4 miles,
one 5 miles, fifteen 6 miles, one 9 miles, two 10 miles, thirty-nine 12 miles, one 18
miles, one 50 kilometers, one 130 miles, four 200 miles, and one more than 200 miles.
Harlow, Legal Aspects of Claims to Jurisdiction in Coastal Waters, 23 JAG. J. 81, 85
(Dec. 1968-Jan. 1969).
67. 43 U.S.C. § 1331-43 (1964).
68. Anti-Smuggling Act, 19 U.S.C. §§ 1701-11 (1964).
69. Fisheries Zone Contiguous to Territorial Sea of the United States, 16 U.S.C.A.
§ 1091-94 (Supp. 1969).
70. Comment, Conflicting State and Federal Claims of Title in Submerged Lands of
the Continental Shelf, 56 YALE LJ. 356, 367 (1947).
71. H.R. REP. No. 695, supra note 56, at 78; United States v. California, 332 U.S.
19, 22-38 (1947). In the latter authority the Court reviewed past cases suggesting
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determined the issue of ownership on the ground "that the constitutional
responsibilities of the national government in its relations with other
sovereignties, involving among other things commerce, the freedom
of the seas, and especially national defense, give it a paramount power
equivalent to ownership over the resources of the lands." 72 State claims
to ownership are not aided by the various laws admitting them to state-
hood. "[N]ot a single act of admission specifies, with any degree of
clarity, the extent of inland waters within the various states' boun-
daries." 73 Some support may be found in historical documents, includ-
ing colonial charters, but such arguments have been ineffective in past
cases.74 Even if some basis for state ownership were to be found, this
alone would be insufficient to convey ownership of the seabed mineral
wealth.75
Several constitutional problems arise in connection with state owner-
ship. Obviously, if a state had control further out into the sea than the
central government, which is constitutionally responsible for interna-
tional affairs, conflicts might arise as a result of the state "dictating to
the Federal Government matters which are clearly outside... [a state's]
constitutional jurisdiction. ... 71 As discussed above, the Submerged
Lands Act of 1953, which granted the coastal states ownership to a
distance of three miles, has been upheld as constitutional. There are
arguments and case precedent, however, that the grant was, in fact,
unconstitutional because "the United States can no more relinquish its
sovereignty to the submerged lands than it can yield the sovereignty it
possesses over the Federal Union as a whole." 7' In its decision uphold-
ing the constitutionality of the Submerged Lands Act in Alabama v.
state ownership and determined that none were convincing. There was, however, one
relevant case supporting the position of the United States. This English decision in-
volved a dispute between the central government and the Duchy of Cornwall and
was arbitrated in favor of the central authorities as to the mineral rights in the seabed
beyond the low-water line. Evidently this was arbitration and not really a judicial
decision. Clark, National Sovereignty and Dominion over Lands Underlying the
Ocean, 27 TEXAs L. Rxv. 140, 147-48 (1948).
72. Hanna, supra note 2, at 195.
73. Gross, supra note 64, at 666.
74. See Scharfenberg, supra note 51, § C, at 1, col. 8.
75. H.R. RaP. No. 695, supra note 56, at 86. "State boundaries have no necessary
connections or relations with the title to lands .... A national park is a good example of
land owned by the United States that is within a state boundary."
76. S. REP. No. 133, supra note 63, at 30.
77. H.R. REP. No. 215, supra note 22, at 11.
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Texas78 the Supreme Court did not consider the 1892 case of Illinois
Central R.R. Co. v. Illinois,79 which decided that a state government held
land beneath a harbor in trust for the public and could not sell it.8 0
There is some legal support for state ownership of the seabed by es-
toppel. Since the states exercised undisputed control over the seabed
for more than one hundred years, they possibly would have won the
early suits by claiming estoppel if the rules normally applied to land
suits between individuals had been followed. The Court refused to
apply estoppel against the United States8' by, in effect, denying the
states "status as a sovereign." 82 In the 1947 California decision the Court
ignored cases decided over the years "whose necessary implications were
that the states and not the United States owned the submerged areas
within their limits, or where no seaward boundaries were claimed, to
three miles from low-water mark." ' This refusal to follow precedent
is in keeping with the modem tendency of the Court,84 and it has been
suggested that most lawyers would have decided the issue in favor
of the states.85 In Toomer v. Witsell,86 South Carolina was allowed to
control fishing in its coastal waters. If a state retains this power, it is
arguable that it also should have ownership of the seabed. Constitu-
tionally, the federal government is to raise revenue by taxation, not by
ownership of profit-producing land,87 and to permit federal ownership
may be a threat to the federalism that is basic to our form of
government. 88
78. 347 U.S. 272 (1954).
79. 146 U.S. 387 (1892).
80. id. at 453: "The trust devolving upon the State for the public, and which can
only be discharged by the management and control of property in which the public
has an interest, cannot be relinquished by a transfer of property."
81. United States v. California, 332 U.S. 19, 39-40 (1947).
82. H.R. REP. No. 1778, supra note 6, at 16.
83. Hardwick, supra note 9, at 402.
84. Illig, supra note 9, at 51-60.
85. Hanna, supra note 2.
86. 334 U.S. 385 (1948).
87. Hardwicke, supra note 9, at 419.
88. Id. at 431-32:
The nature of our federal system under the Constitution contemplates
both states and Federal Government performing their respective func-
tions .... Even though the United States may have been legally justified
in retaining vast areas within the states not necessary for governmental
purposes, it is violating the fundamental principles of the Union and its
development in accordance with the principle of federalism when it
refuses to divest itself of such areas. By such refusal, it becomes an
imperial government holding territory within the states for non-govern-
19701
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Decisions in the various off-shore land cases are based upon three
principles. Those made before passage of the Submerged Lands Act
were based on responsibility for international affairs. After passage
of the Act, the cases followed historical documents in order to deter-
mine whether individual Gulf states were entitled to either three miles
or three leagues of seabed. Finally, in drawing the line separating state
and federal ownership, the Court has looked to international law. Per-
haps instead of such principles the issue would have been better decided
on an equitable basis.s9
Equitable Considerations
Equitable arguments may be made in support of both sides of the
seabed-ownership dispute. The states' strongest argument is one of
estoppel, since they exercised undisputed control over the seabed for
a substantial period 0 Also, lease revenues have become an important
part of some states' income. In short, the states have traditionally "been
the landowning units." 91 The federal government, on the other hand,
is not interested in complete control of offshore areas, desiring only the
valuable oil, and having no interest in the less valuable resources such as
"fish, shrimp, oysters, kelp, and other products of the marginal sea." 92
It has been argued that state control results in faster, more efficient
development of oil resources because regulations imposed are less strin-
gent.9" Certainly, state administration is at least as efficient as federal
supervision.94 Considering the views of the inland states, few have
mental purposes, a practice which threatens the Constitutional founda-
tions of an indestructible union of indestructible states and which, if
extended to its logical implications, would end in a union composed
of states without land or resources (except for grants-in-aid) a consti-
tutional monstrosity.
89. United States v. Louisiana, 363 U.S. 1, 89-90, 98 (1960) (Black, J., dissenting).
"It is . . . my view that since we cannot look to legalistic tests of tide, we must look
to the claims, understandings, expectations and uses of the states throughout their
history." Id. at 90.
90. H.R. REP. No. 1778, supra note 6, at 17. "Too many people have acted over too
long a period of time under a justifiable and reasonable belief for the Congress to
refuse to vest in the States the submerged lands within their boundaries, merely
because of the lack of a technical legal consideration moving from the states."
91. Hardwicke, supra note 9, at 408.
92. H.R. REP. No. 1778, supra note 6, at 22.
93. See Hardwicke, supra note 9, at 436.
94. H.R. RE'. No. 1778, supra note 6, at 19.
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objected to coastal states' ownership of the seabed. 5 Alabama and Rhode
Island, both coastal states, were the only two which attacked the con-
stitutionality of the Submerged Lands Act.9
Similar arguments may be made, however, for the federal position.
The claim is that federal ownership is more beneficial to the nation and
all its citizens, that since all citizens of the United States own the off-
shore oil, it should not be given to the residents of a few coastal states.f7
It is contended that federal control is desirable so that some oil will be
conserved for future use,98 and held as "a vital reserve for the national
defense." '1 Federal leasing, to be sure, allows the leasee much less free-
dom to do as he wishes but it is argued that such practice benefits the
public. 100 Historically, the federal government has held large amounts
of land within the states themselves, and continues to hold such land, 01
and "gifts" of offshore lands to the states might result in a demand by
states for other federally owned lands. 0
2
Feasibility
Any proposed solution should be evaluated in terms of practical
considerations, including the political and the engineering feasibility of
any solution. Would the proposed solution be politically acceptable to
all, or at least most, of the interested parties; would it be possible to
implement in terms of present engineering capabilities?
The Submerged Lands Act requires that a line be drawn separating
federal and state ownership. Congress apparently assumed that siich a
line could be drawn when the law was passed. The Supreme Court was
in agreement with Congress, and has tried to construct such a boundary.
A temporary line has already been drawn off the Louisiana coast, the
so-called Chapman Line which was established "by unilateral adminis-
trative determination on the part of the United States ... ." 10 It was
95. Id. at 17. No inland state sent a representative to protest before the committee
considering a bill granting coastal states ownership.
96. Supra, note 30.
97. Truman, Tidelands Bill Veto, 98 CoNG. REc. 6251 (1952).
98. H.R. REP'. No. 695, supra note 56, at 86. The states evidently made no moves
toward conservation.
99. 99 CoNG. REc. 3362 (1953) (reprint from N.Y. Times, Apr. 20, 1953, at 24, col. 3).
100. Clark, supra note 71, at 153-56.
101. Hardwicke, supra note 9, at 426.
102. H.R. REP. No. 695, supra note 56, at 86.
103. Lewis, The State-Federal Interim Agreement Concerning Offshore Leasing and
Operations, 33 Tut.. L. REv. 331, 335 (1959).
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used pending the outcome of litigation between Louisiana and the
United States.104
Assuming the feasibility of drawing the line, the problem of dual
regulation still persists. This might arise where the same body of oil
is partially situated on both federal and state land.1 5 Mr. Justice Clark
believes that this problem could be resolved in the same manner as it
has been resolved between inland property owners.10 6
At one time the federal government established two lines three miles
off the Louisiana coast. One was the Chapman Line; the other was
created by "the Department of Labor in connection with the adminis-
"1 1017tration of the Longshoremen's and Harbor Workers' Act ....
Although both were three-mile lines, they varied greatly. 08 This illus-
trates the difficulties in drawing a boundary a fixed distance from the
coastline. In many places it is impossible for any line three miles from
the existing coastline to be permanent because the coastline is con-
tinuously changing due to accretion. 109 Off the coasts of Louisiana
and Mississippi the water increases in depth very gradually, and islands
continually appear and disappear.110 There is also a problem with land
recession which is evidenced by the fact that approximately one and
one-fourth miles of the western Louisiana coast has disappeared into
the sea."' There are also special difficulties in drawing the coastline
separating "the open sea from bays, harbors, ports, sounds, and other
inland waters." 112 The Supreme Court attempted to resolve this by
application of the Geneva Convention on the Territorial Sea and the
Continguous Zone.113 These geological problems demonstrate the dif-
ficulty and perhaps the impossibility of measuring ownership from a
historic boundary. The Supreme Court, in United States v. Louisiana,
however, decided that the Texas claim should be measured from its
boundary when admitted as a state." 4
104. Id. at 332-33.
105. Hardwicke, supra note 9, at 439.
106. Clark, supra note 71, at 156.
107. Wright, supra note 23, at 181.
108. Id.
109. Lewis, supra note 103, at 335; H.R. REP. No. 1778, supra note 6, at 10.
110. United States v. Louisiana, 363 U.S. 1, 82 (1960); Joint Hearings on S. 1988
and Similar House Bills Before the Committees on the Judiciary, 80th Cong., 2d Sess.
at 384-85 (1948).
111. Joint Hearings on S. 1988, supra note 110, at 385.
112. H.R. REP. No. 1778, supra note 6, at 10.
113. See text accompanying note 40, supra.
114. See text accompanying note 44, supra.
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If drawing a line is too impractical, and it is necessary to divide the
offshore wealth between state and federal governments, perhaps reve-
nue division according to some fixed ratio or formula is the answer.
Under such a plan complete ownership might be vested in one level
of government. This is the current practice with respect to federally-
owned land within states provided for under the Mineral Leasing Act.115
Whatever the ultimate disposition of the seabed, it must be politically
feasible. Many states were dissatisfied with the original Supreme Court
decisions holding that the federal government owned all submerged
coastal lands. This discontent resulted in Congress' enacting the Sub-
merged Lands Act of 1953. Likewise, many states have been disappointed
with the Court decisions and activities of the Justice Department sub-
sequent to 1953. The-twenty-three states which border on the sea have
a total of forty-six senators and two hundred and thirty-four congress-
men;" 6 obviously this is a potent political force.
POSSIBLE SOLUTIONS
In order to select the most acceptable solution, the various alterna-
tives, in light of the more important aspects of the international, legal,
equitable, and practical considerations must be reviewed. For this pur-
pose it is expedient to group the possibilities into absolute and com-
promise solutions. 17
Absolute Solutions
Under this type of solution complete ownership would be given to
one of the two levels of government. Such a disposition of the problem
would be a complete and permanent remedy; it would be impossible,
however, to justify any such solution in light of the various relevant
considerations.
In the international realm the United States is responsible for interna-
115. 30 U.S.C. § 191 (1964).
All money received from sales, bonuses, royalties, and rentals of public
lands . . . shall be paid into the Treasury of the United States, 371/2 per
centum thereof shall be paid by the Secretary of the Treasury . . . each
year to the State within the boundaries of which the leased lands or
deposits are or were located . . . and of those from Alaska, 52Y2 per
centum thereof shall be paid to the State of Alaska ....
116. STATISTICAL ABsTRACT oF nE UNITED STATEs 1969, at 360.
117. Ifig, supra note 9, at 57. Illig suggests three alternatives: "(1) permit the areas
to be attached to the abutting coastal states, (2) treat the lands as subject to exclusive
federal control, and (3) some middle ground between these two points of view." Id.
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tional affairs but has historically tolerated state claims of ownership and
continues to acquiesce in the exercise of many powers by the states.
Equitably, it was inconsistent to allow the states to have the benefits
of ownership for an extended period and then take these away, yet it
is equally inequitable for the coastal states to gain all the benefits from
the immense offshore wealth.
Feasibility would present a problem in implementing any absolute
solution. The first attempts by the Supreme Court to solve the dispute
were absolute, giving complete ownership to the United States. This
solution, however, proved unacceptable to Congress. Due to the close
balance of power in Congress between coastal and noncoastal states any
such absolute decision is politically infeasible. There appears to be,
therefore, no justifiable or realistic grounds supporting an absolute settle-
ment in favor of either the coastal states or federal government.
Compromise Solutions
Compromise would involve a division of the seabed wealth between
state and federal governments. This is the more realistic and justifiable
solution to the ownership dispute. The arguments in the areas of inter-
national, legal, and equitable considerations are best met by compromise,
and compromise is more practical in view of the delicate balance of
political interests in Congress.
The Congressional answer to the offshore oil problem, the Submerged
Lands Act, was a compromise solution. It took years of intense effort
for the coastal states to obtain passage of the Act. While this effort has
failed to settle the dispute, it did not fail because it was a compromise
but rather because indefinite, and therefore impractical, standards of
dividing the revenues were used.
In the Act, Congress attempted to establish a fixed line three miles
from the coast, but geological conditions make it extremely difficult,
if not impossible, to draw such a line. The Act allowed some states to
claim more area than others on the basis of complicated and impractical
standards. The definition of "coastline" was inadequate because it pro-
vided that the low-water mark along landed areas was to be the line
from which the three miles of state ownership was to be measured and
failed to make any provision at all in water areas. In many areas the
coastline is constantly changing so that the line would have to continu-
ally be redrawn. Another more practical line, such as the Coast Guard
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Navigation Line suggested by Louisiana,11 should have been used. Gulf
Coast states were allowed to claim substantially more than other states
if they could prove ownership of this extra amount at the time of ad-
mission to the Union. The Submerged Lands Act should have avoided
discrimination on the basis of such a complicated standard.
After passage of the Act the Supreme Court had an opportunity to
partially remedy these weaknesses. Instead, the Court confused matters
even more by refusing to adopt the Coast Guard Navigation Line, a
practical and easily determined line, as the coastline in both land and
water areas. Gulf states were forced to use their historic boundaries
even though determination of this line is impossible.
A RECOMIMENDED SOLUTION
As noted above, a compromise would appear to be the best solution
to the land-ownership disputes, and, considering the opposing political
and economic interests, the most likely to be enacted by Congress. The
difficult problem is to find a practical method of effecting the compro-
mise, of dividing the wealth of the seabed between state and federal
governments.
Any attempt to divide the wealth by dividing the seabed, as in the
Submerged Lands Act, is likely to fail. Clearly the Act has been unsuc-
cessful at resolving the dispute.
The best method of wealth division would be to give ownership of
the seabed to one level of government and have that government divide
the lease revenues with the other. The only significant area of dispute
would be the amount of the revenue given to each. Once this was set-
tled, judicially or legislatively, that should settle the dispute. There is
legislative precedent for such a solution. Today the revenues from leased
federal land are divided with the state in which the land is located under
the Mineral Leasing Act. Under this statute the state receives 37.5 per-
cent of the revenue and the federal government collects the remaining
amount.119
A bill dividing revenues was proposed as a temporary solution to the
seabed dispute in 1952.120 The resolution passed both houses of Con-
gress after being amended so as to delete the revenue-dividing feature
118. See text accompanying notes 45-48, supra.
119. 30 U.S.C. § 191 (1964).
120. SJ. Res. 20, 82d Cong., 1st Sess. (1952).
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but was vetoed by President Truman. 12 1 In 1952 little drilling beyond
three miles was technologically possible, but today drilling takes place
far beyond the three-mile line. Under the present Submerged Lands
Act the states get nothing from drilling beyond three miles or leagues.
The limits of the present Act and the improved technology allowing
drilling far out into the sea are primarily responsible for the current
preparations by coastal states to introduce new offshore legislation in
Congress. Division of revenues on a percentage basis as under the Min-
eral Leasing Act for all leases, no matter how far out, would be more
appealing to the states today.
If all income from leases of offshore lands was split, the federal gov-
ernment could lose revenue. It is likely, however, that unless the income-
splitting plan is adopted, pressure from the coastal states will result in
the adoption of another solution by which the federal government could
lose even more income.
Finally, a study of solutions to the offshore land problem which other
federal governments have adopted lends further support to the argu-
ments favoring an income-splitting plan. In Canada the issue of owner-
ship was submitted to the Canadian Supreme Court and it, like its
American counterpart, decided the issue in favor of the central gov-
ernment. The response of .the Canadian provinces, needless to say, was
unfavorable. When faced with the same problem, Australia adopted a
compromise plan calling for a division of the revenues with forty per-
cent going to the commonwealth and sixty percent to the states. The
Australian plan has adequately solved the dispute. The Australian plan
has met with favorable results in a situation similar to that presently
faced by our federal government.'22
The Americans can also solve their offshore land dispute by follow-
ing the example of the Australians and the example set by the Mineral
Leasing Act. The seabed should be given by statute to the federal gov-
ernment because of its responsibilities for international affairs and
defense, but the revenue from leases and the exploitation of the area
should be divided according to some percentage basis such as that in
the present Mineral Leasing Act. This would be an equitable and prac-
tical solution to the offshore dispute.
JAMES W. CORBIrr, JR.
121. 98 CoNG. REc. 6251 (1952).
122. Warbick, Off-Shore Petroleum Exploitation in Federal Systems: Canadian and
Australian Action, 17 INTL & COMp. L.Q. 501-13 (1968).
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